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disagreed, pointing out that in the gambling ship situation, the Legislature was dealing
with only one immediate problem. Said the court:
"It is not uncommon for the Legislature to use more explicit language in statutes
dealing with limited specific problems than it does in statutes of more general applica-
tion."2 1
The gamblers' statute showed that the Legislature had the power to make such
a law, i.e., to make the mere asking a punishable act despite the fact that the ultimate
harm was to occur elsewhere.
And thus ended the case of People v. Burt, establishing the law that while one
may with impunity conspire in California to commit a crime outside of that state,
he may not solicit in California the doing of an act which, if done within the state,
would constitute one of the twelve major crimes enumerated in the Penal Code.
"Cest la gingrale loi des loix, que chacun observe celle dus Hew oA i est." (It is the
general law of laws that everyone should observe that of the place where he is.)22
Albert Bianchi.
EQUITY: REMOVAL OF RESTmICTIVE COVENANTS IN CALIFORNIA-WHIAT CONSTI-
TUTES CHANGED CONDITIONS.-The removal of restrictive covenants because of changed
conditions is a question which looms large on the horizon for California courts.
The growing population is a call to business to relocate in areas heretofore exclusively
residential. Therefore the answer to the question "What constitutes changed conditions
in California?" is of prime importance.
The attitude of the Supreme Court of California upon this subject has been
indicated in the recent case of Wolff v. Fallon.' The plaintiff had purchased his lot
in 1938 knowing of the restrictions. The restrictions were of a type common to tract
subdivisions, specifying the type of building, the minimum cost, the location of the
building in regard to the property lines, and restricting the lot to use as a private
dwelling. In subdividing this tract in 1913, the' original grantor had imposed these
restrictions upon 740 lots. Two separate areas within the tract were set aside for
commercial development and left unrestricted. The plaintiff's lot bordered on one of
these unrestricted zones. To show the changes which had occurred, affecting his
property, the plaintiff introduced the following evidence:
1. The lots along the street, including the plaintiff's, were zoned as a "Commercial
District" by a city ordinance in 1921.
2. Four minor violations of the restrictions had occurred within the tract.
3. The boulevard adjoining the plaintiff's lot carried a greatly increased traffic
in commercial vehicles, streetcars and buses.
4. Testimony by real estate brokers that the lot in question was now unsuitable
for residential purposes and an "intelligent development" for commercial use would
not be detrimental to the adjacent residents.
Upon this evidence the trial court granted the declaratory relief the plaintiff
sought-removal of the restrictions. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of California on appeal.
Assuming that restrictions are valid when imposed, the removal of these restric-
tions involves two conflicting interests. The purchaser of a lot has a right to rely
People v. Burt, 45 Cal2d - , 288 P.2d 503, 506 (1955).
I= 1 MONTAIGNE, ESSAYS (1580).
144 Cal.2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955).
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upon the restrictions to preserve the residential character of his neighborhood. 2
Conflicting with this interest is the fact that changes in the general area may cause
the restriction to be harsh and inequitable upon a lot owner, without securing any
benefits to the other lot owners. 3
The problem is presented to the courts in two situations.
1. Where an injunction against violating a restriction is sought and the changed
conditions are raised as a defense.
2. Where the plaintiff seeks the removal of the restrictions under a declaratory
judgment statute,4 on the basis of changed conditions.
Regardless of whether the question is raised by way of defense against an
injunction or in seeking affirmative relief the courts have come to regard certain
factors as providing the key to what will amount to changed conditions. In enumer-
ating these factors, cases illustrating the views taken of them will be reviewed.
1. The size of the restricted area.
In Robertson v. Nichols5 the restricted tract consisted of 117 lots and the change
of conditions occurred along the border of the tract. The court, in holding the restric-
tions were enforceable, based its decision upon the fact that the changes on the fringe
of the restricted area did not destroy the residential value of the interior lots. In
another California case 6 the plaintiff, owner of one of two restricted lots, sought
relief from the restriction because of the changed conditions. Relief was granted,
partially because such a small area cannot retain its residential character as well as
a larger area. It is obvious that a small restricted area will be affected by changing
conditions in and about the area much more readily than a large restricted tract. One
aspect of the size factor is whether the whole area must be affected by the changed
conditions or whether affecting a substantial part of the tract will justify the removal
of the restrictions. In Wolff v. Fallon, in a dissenting opinion, 7 Justice Spence cited
Marra v. Aetna Construction Companys as authority for the view that changed con-
ditions must have "rendered the purpose of the restrictions obsolete." The use of the
word obsolete would seem to indicate that only when the whole area was affected by
the changed conditions can the restriction be removed. It is suggested that "obsolete"
was not used in an imperative sense in the cited case as the court stated later in the
opinion that "the property in question is no longer sufficiently desirable for residential
use to warrant enforcement of the restrictions." 9 The unqualified use of the word
"obsolete" to describe the status of the restriction carries with it the implication that
courts will enforce restrictions so long as a spark of life remains in them. The opinion
does qualify the word and in essence says, if substantial benefits may still be derived
from the restriction it will be enforced. California' ° and other states" have taken
'Id. at 698, 284 P.2d at 805.
'Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N.E. 691 (1831).
' CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1060; Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931).
'92 Cal.App.2d 201, 206 P.2d 898 (1949).
'Marra v. Aetna Const. Co., 15 Cal.2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
See note 1 supra at 698, 284 P.2d at 805.
8 See note 6 supra.
'Id. at 379-80, 101 P.2d at 493.
10 Miles v. Clarke, 44 Cal.App. 539, 187 Pac. 167 (1919).
"Neilson v. Hiral Realty Co., 172 Misc. 408, 16 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1939) ; Wineman Realty Co. v.
Pelavin, 267 Mich. 594, 255 N.W. 393 (1934) ; Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Church,
328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d 545 (1931) ; Mechling v. Dawson, 234 Ky. 318, 28 S.W.2d 18 (1930) ; McClure
v. Leaycraft, 183 N.Y. 36, 75 N.E. 961 (1905). The view is approved by the RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY, § 564, Com. C. (1944).
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the view that restrictive covenants will be enforced if they are of "substantial value"
to remaining lot owners and if no "radical" changes have occurred.
2. The location of the changed condition in relation to the restricted area.
In viewing this factor it is easy to see that the greater the distance the commercial
activity is from the residential area the less injurious will it be to the home owner.
Conversely, business activity carried on next door will be felt immediately. In between
the extremes lies the bone of contention. It is largely a matter of discretion for the
courts to decide upon the particular facts. The greatest controversy concerning the
location of the change has arisen as to whether the change must have occurred within
the restricted area or merely in the surrounding area. California has granted aflfrma-
tive relief where the change in conditions has been entirely outside the restricted area.
In Downs v. Kroeger12 the court expressed this view, saying "it would be unjust,
oppressive, and inequitable to give effect to the restrictions, if such change has resulted
from causes other than their breach."' 3 (Emphasis added.) The result of such a view
is obvious. The only place where change from a residential to a business area can
occur without violating residential restrictions is outside the restricted tract. A more
strict view was taken in Grady v. Garland,14 where the court refused to remove racial
restrictions on the basis of changed conditions outside the restricted tract. As pointed
out by the dissenting opinion, 15 this holding denies effect to the rule that restrictive
covenants will not be enforced when they serve only to burden those seeking their
removal without securing any substantial benefits to those seeking to enforce them.
The result of a view such as the majority proposed is to create a situation where one
lot owner within a restricted tract, by enjoining any attempted violation of the
restriction, can maintain the covenants contrary to the wishes of every other lot
owner. The view is contrary to the underlying public policy favoring the free and
unrestricted use of property. The courts appear to grant relief more freely when the
changes have occurred within the tract but they have also removed restrictions when
changed conditions wholly outside the area have caused the restrictions to lose their
vitality.
3. The type of change that has occurred.
While this factor does not appear to have the weight accorded the two factors
previously mentioned, the courts will consider the type of change in balancing the
conflicting interests. A business that is compatible with a residential zone may locate
within or very near the restricted area without upsetting the general residential
character. 16 Some types of business may be of a nature that would clash violently
with the residential atmosphere although further removed from the area than those
which did not affect the tract. The courts in handling problems concerned with this
type of change have made wide use of their discretionary powers in granting or with-
holding relief.
4. The conduct of the parties or their predecessors in title.
When the grantor or his grantees, after acquiring actual knowledge of a viola-
tion of the restriction, fail to enforce the restriction by an injunction they waive the
" 200 Cal. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927).
23 Id. 200 Cal. at 747, 254 Pac. at 1102.
"89 F.2d 817 (Wash. D.C. 1937).
"Id. at 820; see MCCLmTOCK, EQurr, § 128 (2d Ed. 1948).
"Jackson v. Lane, 142 NJ. Eq. 193, 59 A.2d 662 (1948) ; Braswell v. Woods, Tex. Civ. App.,
199 S.W.2d 253 (1947) ; McLaughin v. Eldredge, 266 Mass. 387, 165 N.E. 419 (1929).
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right to enforce it.17 A failure to notify the breaching party", or to declare the power
to enforce the restriction a reasonable time after its breach,' 9 will result in a loss of
the power to enforce the restriction. However, to maintain this defense, the party
invoking it must show a financial loss as a result of the plaintiff's waiver.2 0 It is
doubtful that such a waiver could occur in a large tract as the violation would have
to come within the actual knowledge of every home owner in the tract, without any
action being taken. Every owner of a restricted lot has the power to enforce the
restrictions imposed upon the other lots in his tract.2 '
5. The intention of the original grantor imposing the restrictions upon the
land.
This factor is considered by the courts to determine if the changed conditions
have thwarted the purpose of the grantor in imposing the restrictions, or if his plan
may still yield substantial benefits. Public policy, favoring the free and unencumbered
passage of property, calls for a strict construction of the language in the deed
against the grantor. 22 For this reason the grantor must clearly express the purpose
of imposing the restriction.
6. The time remaining in the restrictive covenant.
The oppressive features of a restrictive covenant are not generally so harsh if
they are to remain only for a short time, whereas those of long or unlimited duration
will weigh heavily upon the party seeking their removal. The courts are apparently
more willing to grant relief when the restriction is long or of unlimited time. In either
case the time remaining is not conclusive. 23
A review of cases where changed conditions are raised in defense against an
injunction or in seeking the removal of a restriction reveals the absence of any precise
rules. It is submitted that the use of legislative measures to achieve a degree of
precision in this field of the law does not provide the solution to the over-all problem.
The use of statutes could perhaps crystallize this body of the law into definite rules,
but at too great a price. They would place severe limitations upon the discretionary
power so vital to problems of this nature. The questions come within equity's juris-
diction 24 and to settle the conflicts equity has exercised its inherent discretionary
powers. The absence of precise rules is a natural by-product of this discretion.
To shackle this power of discretion is to remove the essential element, which when
applied to the peculiar facts of each controversy insures a just decision.
Perhaps the future litigation will reveal an even wider use of this discretion. Much
of the harshness that results from a complete denial of an injunction or of affirmative
relief from restrictions could be prevented by an extended use of modified decrees
and injunctions. A court of equity could lift the restriction for only specified busi-
nesses, or readjust the boundary of the restricted area to conform with the changed
1? German-American Savings Bank v. Grollmer, 155 Cal. 683, 102 Pac. 932 (1909).
18 Morgan v. Veach, 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 139 P.2d 976 (1943).
'
8 Wedum-Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal.App.2d 745, 64 P.2d 762 (1937).2oThornton v. Middletown Educational Corp., 21 Cal.App.2d 707, 70 P.2d 234 (1937).
2' Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Cal.App.2d 201, 206 P.2d 898 (1949) ; Martin v. Ray, 76 Cal.App.2d
471, 173 P.2d 573 (1946) ; Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931) ; Wayt v.
Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 269 Pac. 660 (1928) ; McBride v. Freeman, 191 Cal. 152, 215 Pac. 678 (1923);
Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919).
2 Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d 818, 151 P.2d 260 (1944) ; Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174,
183 Pac. 945 (1919).
28 Marra v. Aetna Const. Co., 15 Cal.2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
" MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY, § 124 (2d Ed. 1948).
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